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Abstract
In this essay I argue that given Donnel-
lan’s formulation of the attributive uses of
definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6]
and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most
uses of definite descriptions that are taken
to be attributive turn out not to be so. In
building up to my main thesis, I first con-
sider certain problematic cases of uses of def-
inite descriptions that do not neatly fit into
any category. I then argue that, in gen-
eral, a complete definite description we use is
complex, in which there is an embedded sin-
gular term that is used referentially. From
this I conclude that an attributive use of a
definite description is an extremely rare lin-
guistic phenomenon, much less frequent than
what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have
presupposed; so much so that the standard
examples given by Donnellan of the attribu-
tive use of definite descriptions do not qualify
as attributive.
Donnellan characterizes an attributive use of a
definite description as a use in which a speaker
“wishes to assert something about whatever or
whoever fits that description.” [2, p. 285] I shall
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argue that given this formulation, most uses of de-
scriptions that we have thought to be attributive
will turn out not to be so.
We may wish to capture this conception of the
attributive use in terms of a certain sort of seman-
tic intention, as Kripke suggests:
“In a given idiolect, the semantic ref-
erent of a designator (without indexi-
cals) is given by a general intention of
the speaker to refer to a certain object
whenever the designator is used. The
speaker’s referent is given by a specific
intention, on a given occasion, to re-
fer to a certain object [. . . ] My hy-
pothesis is that Donnellan’s referential-
attributive distinction should be gener-
alized in this light [. . . ] In one case
(the “simple” case), his specific intention
is simply to refer to the semantic refer-
ent; that is, his specific intention is sim-
ply his general semantic intention [. . . ]
Alternatively—the “complex” case—he
has a specific intention, which is distinct
from his general intention, but which he
believes, as a matter of fact, to determine
the same object as the one determined by
his general intention.” [6, 173-174]
More recently, Salmon, criticizing Kripke for
having left out the epistemic condition of “having
an object in mind” for the referential use, gener-
alizes “the attributive use” as follows:
“Let us distinguish between general-
ized referential and generalized attribu-
tive uses as follows. In a g-attributive
use of a singular term, the speaker has a
primary, identifying, purely semantic in-
tention of the form dBy my use of this
term, I intend to refer to αe, where α is
a definite description. This intention is
general, as opposed to singular; it is a
de dicto intention. Further, the speaker
does not have in addition a supplemen-
tary primary linguistic intention of the
form dBy my use of this term, I intend
to refer to βe that is not purely seman-
tic in nature, or where β is a directly
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referential, Millian term (e.g. a name)
for an individual person or object that
the speaker ‘has in mind’, in the relevant
sense. Here there is no potential conflict
(from the point of view of pure seman-
tics) with the primary de dicto linguistic
intention, and speaker reference is there-
fore governed by that purely semantic in-
tention” [10, p. 258-259].
Though there is disagreement between Kripke
and Salmon on how to extend Donnellan’s dis-
tinction to apply to the uses of proper names, it
appears that their accounts are essentially simi-
lar with respect to the attributive uses of definite
descriptions.1 There is however good textual evi-
dence that Donnellan did not wish to be too strict
about this characterization of the attributive use.
Here is a passage in which Donnellan talks about
a possible attributive use where the speaker does
not have the intention to talk about exactly what-
ever or whoever fits that description:
“In one example of the attributive use
in my paper, a person upon finding
the body of his friend Smith exclaims,
“Smith’s murderer is insane.” In the ex-
ample, the speaker had no particular per-
son in mind as Smith’s murderer [. . . ]
suppose that while Smith did die of nat-
ural causes, he has indeed been assaulted
before death and that the evidence that
led the speaker to attribute insanity to
“Smith’s murderer” is still good evidence
that his assailant is insane. In a sense the
speaker has scored a “near miss.” [. . . ] A
1There is still no consensus on what exactly the dis-
tinction between the referential and the attributive uses of
terms is supposed to be. Donnellan does not provide us
with any strict criteria, which leaves the door open to dif-
ferent but incompatible interpretations. As I will try to
show below there are examples of uses of definite descrip-
tions that turn out to be “referential” for one philosopher,
“attributive” for another, and “neither referential not at-
tributive” for some other philosopher. I believe that this
apparent inconsistency is due to the fact that there are two
separate distinctions that are inherent in Donnellan’s dis-
cussion of the matter. Furthermore Donnellan has never
given us the conditions for “having an object in mind”
which seems to be an essential feature of a referential use.
For a detailed discussion of both of these points see my [4].
near miss occurs with an attributive use
when nothing exactly fits the description
used, but some individual or other does
fit a description in some sense close in
meaning to the one used. Only in the ref-
erential use can a speaker have “missed
by a mile,” because only that use involves
a particular entity that the description
either fits neatly, just misses, or wildly
misses. Once this is seen, taking near
misses into account does not blur the dis-
tinction. If anything, it helps one to see
what the distinction is.”2 [3, p. 210]
Neither Kripke nor Salmon, it seems, has been
concerned by the fact that their formulations do
not admit of “near misses” for attributive uses.3
But what is more important for our purpose
is Donnellan’s position, which also follows from
Salmon’s account, that “only in the case of a ref-
erential use can one “miss wildly””. 4 Prima facie
this sounds quite plausible, but as we shall see
there are cases of “wild misses” that could not be
classified as referential uses, and have strong at-
tributive flavor.
The least important of such cases is when the
speaker has a slip of the tongue: given the tragic
2The distinction between “near” and “wild” misses is
originally due to MacKay [7]. As the quote from Donnellan
above reveals it certainly is not a very precise distinction,
and I do not intend to sharpen it. Vague and imprecise as
it may be, I believe that the examples that MacKay and
Donnellan have given do appeal to our intuitions.
3Under Salmon’s account, such cases turn out to be nei-
ther referential nor attributive, though under Kripke’s ac-
count they turn out to be referential uses. That is because
of the fact that Kripke leaves out the “having in mind”
condition for the referential use, as Salmon points out. See
the last footnote to his [10]. On the other hand, to my
knowledge Searle is the only one who makes an issue of the
so-called near misses in the attributive use, by arguing that
under Donnellan’s characterization of the referential use in
his [3], such near misses turn out to be referential uses, and
concluding that this characterization of the referential use
“isn’t quite right even on Donnellan’s own terms.” [11, p.
191]
4MacKay [7] argues that in those cases when a speaker
uses a definite description referentially and scores a wild
miss, the speaker does not succeed in referring to the entity
he has in mind, though he may nonetheless make it known
to his audience what it is that he is talking about. Here I
have agreed with Donnellan, that such referential uses are
cases in which the speaker could succeed in referring.
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situation the speaker says “Sam’s murderer is in-
sane”, intending to refer to Smith’s murderer (at-
tributively) and not Sam’s. This does seem to be
a wild miss, and thus cannot be classified as an
attributive use, though I doubt that such “slips of
the tongue” have any philosophical significance.5
There are, however, more interesting cases. Con-
sider, for instance, a modified version of one of
Donnellan’s examples [2, p. 290-291]. A man
comes across a group of people who refer to some-
one they take to be their leader as “the king”.
The man has heard from a reliable source that
the person they refer to is in fact a usurper, but
he has no inkling who this person is; all he knows
is that the person referred to by the group as “the
king”, whoever he may be, is in fact not the ac-
tual king. We may imagine him saying: “I would
like to meet the king.” Now what should we say
about the man’s use of the term “the king”? It
does not seem to be a referential use, for he does
not have anyone in mind; he simply wishes to say
something about whoever these people refer to as
“the king”. But is it then an attributive use? No
doubt there is a temptation to say so, though the
man rather then simply scoring a near miss seems
to have missed by a mile. Such a use is simply not
an attributive use under any of the accounts given
above.6
In this example, the speaker in a sense uses the
term “the king” deferentially, to refer to whoever it
is these people wrongly take to be their king. There
may be other forms of deference that could have
similar consequences, as suggested by Salmon:
“[. . . ] suppose that the investigating
detective is completely convinced that
Johnson was murdered by the same cul-
prit, so far still unidentified, who com-
5On Kripke’s formulation though, it turns out to be a
complex case and thus a referential use. So a simple slip
of the tongue is good enough to turn a genuine attributive
use into a referential use on Kripke’s account.
6I had come up with this modified version of Donnellan’s
example in a conversation I had with Salmon. My inten-
tion was to show that “Donnellan’s explicit criterion for
attributive use fails to capture his intent” as Salmon sums
up my position [10, p. 212-13, fn.36]. However, it seems
that I was unable to convince Salmon on this issue, for his
current position is that such uses are neither referential nor
attributive, as he states in the same footnote.
mitted the recent, very similar murder
of Smith. The homicide department has
no suspects, no witnesses, and no leads
in either case; the detective’s firm be-
lief is based entirely on the common
MO. When the detective uses the phrase
‘Smith’s murderer’ at the scene of the
later crime, he primarily means: the guy,
whoever he is, who murdered Johnson.
The detective does not actually have the
murderer in mind, in the relevant sense;
otherwise, he could use the phrase refer-
entially. Instead the detective thinks of
Johnson’s murderer by description.” [10,
p. 255]
If we further suppose contrary to what the de-
tective believes, that Smith and Johnson have in
fact been murdered by different people, the detec-
tive’s use of ‘Smith’s murderer’ would be one in
which he scores a wild miss, though there appears
to be an attributive element involved in his use of
the term. Here is Salmon’s assessment of the case:
“[. . . ] these are a kind of pseudo or mock
referential use. In a sense, the mock ref-
erential use is what you get when you
cross referential with attributive [. . . ]
The only thing preventing the use from
being bona-fide referential is the exact
nature of the user’s cognitive access to
the individual. In this respect, mock ref-
erential uses are more attributive than
referential. But in other respects, they
are so much like genuine referential uses
that they ought to have been included in
previous discussions of the referential use
[. . . ]” [10, p. 255]
And later Salmon concludes that such uses are
neither referential nor attributive, which in fact
naturally follows from his generalized formulation
of the two uses. Neale concludes of a similar ex-
ample that “by Donnellan’s own criterion, we have
here an attributive use [. . . ] and a referential in-
terpretation is out of the question” [9, p. 203],
though it is not clear what “Donnellan’s own cri-
terion” is supposed to be. On the other hand,
Kripke would have to conclude that such uses are
9
KRITERION, Nr. 20 (2006), pp. 7-13
referential, given that they fit his “complex case”.
So we seem to have uses of definite descriptions
that turn out to be attributive for Neale, referen-
tial for Kripke, and neither referential nor attribu-
tive for Salmon.
Now it may be suggested that such uses of defi-
nite descriptions are rare, involving a form of def-
erential intention, and could be left out of the pic-
ture. However this is only the tip of the iceberg.
In fact, as we shall see now, in using a definite
description in quite an ordinary context, in which
there is no slip of the tongue, nor any irony or def-
erence involved, a speaker may nonetheless score
a wild miss, and his use of the definite descrip-
tion will not seem to neatly fit into any category.
What I have in mind are the uses of “complex
definite descriptions”, i.e. those with at least one
embedded singular term.
Consider this time a modified and extended ver-
sion of Donnellan’s famous Smith case: Jones, who
is actually innocent, is on trial for the murder of
Smith. One day as he is being brought to court,
someone in the crowd opens fire and kills Jones.
The murderer (of Jones) manages to escape. The
investigator then makes the following announce-
ment: “the police have not yet been able to find
the gun that killed Smith’s murderer”. The use
of the complex description “the gun that killed
Smith’s murderer” by the investigator is certainly
not referential, given that he has no gun in mind.
But is it then an attributive use? In using the
embedded description “Smith’s murderer”, the in-
vestigator has the intention to refer to someone
he has in mind, namely Jones, whom he mistak-
enly believes to have murdered Smith. In using
the larger description “the gun that killed Smith’s
murderer” the investigator’s primary intention is
to talk about the gun that killed the person he has
in mind, and not whatever fits the description. So
it cannot be an attributive use either. We could
get more complicated cases if we considered defi-
nite descriptions that have more than one singular
term embedded in them. In such cases speakers
may have various kinds of intentions regarding the
use of each embedded term. In using such a com-
plex definite description, if the speaker intends to
refer to a particular object that he has in mind,
then no matter how long the definite description
is, we could conclude that such a use is referen-
tial; however if there is no object the speaker has
in mind and no primary intention to refer to what-
ever or whoever fits that description, then we seem
to be at a loss about what to say.
In fact even Donnellan’s own example of the
Smith case, which has served as a paradigmatic
example of the attributive use, is susceptible to
the same kind of consideration. To see this, all we
need to do is imagine that the speaker misidenti-
fies the person whose dead body he comes across
when he says “Smith’s murderer is insane”, where
in fact the body is that of Brown, and not Smith.
If the speaker’s primary intention is to attribute
insanity to the murderer of the person he has in
mind, whose dead body he has observed, then
there is a good sense in which he wishes to
talk about Brown’s murderer, and it is irrele-
vant whether Smith has also been murdered. The
use of the description “Smith’s murderer” in this
particular case is not a referential use, since the
speaker has no particular murderer in mind, but
the speaker also does not intend to refer to who-
ever fits the description. Again the use of the
description does seem to have a very strong at-
tributive flavor, but the speaker has missed by a
mile.7
If we take what Donnellan says at face value, or
adopt Salmon’s generalized version of attributive
uses, then we must admit that such uses are nei-
ther referential nor attributive. Prima facie this
may not seem to be a problem for the distinction is
not supposed to be exhaustive, as both Donnellan
and Kripke point out. There are, no doubt, cer-
tain contexts in which a speaker, in using a definite
description in an utterance, may have no intention
to refer, and may even believe that the description
has no referent.8 But clearly in the above cases the
7What is quite interesting is that Searle never considers
the possibility of wild misses for the attributive use, de-
spite his observation that in using the term “Smith’s mur-
derer” attributively, the speaker may in fact wish to refer to
“the person responsible for what we observed” (p. 203). It
seems that he was not bothered by such considerations, for
he thinks that Donnellan’s distinction is “bogus” (p. 204)
anyway.
8As, for instance, when a speaker uses the term “the
tenth planet” to utter “some scientists wrongly believe that
the tenth planet has been discovered”. In such a case, it
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speaker does use the singular term as a designa-
tor, in its Fregean customary mode, so saying that
they are neither referential nor attributive seems
to be problematic. It is not clear what we should
do with such examples, and it does not seem that
Donnellan’s texts are much help. What is worse is
that complex definite descriptions are not a rare
variety in language. In fact apart from the use of
the so-called incomplete descriptions, almost all
definite descriptions used in languages are com-
plex; leaving them out of the picture would con-
siderably limit the application of Donnellan’s dis-
tinction, thus reducing its theoretical significance.
Now the problem seems to occur only in those
contexts in which a speaker uses an embedded sin-
gular term in a complex definite description ref-
erentially for an object that is not the semantic
referent of that embedded term. So it may be
suggested that when the investigator uses the de-
scription “the gun that killed Smith’s murderer”,
and the person he has in mind whom he wishes
to refer to by using the embedded term “Smith’s
murderer”, is in fact Smith’s murderer, then the
use of the larger description can be unproblem-
atically classified as attributive. But is that so?
After all, the investigator’s primary intention in
such a context is not to make an assertion about
the semantic referent of the term “the gun that
killed Smith’s murderer”; rather, he intends to
talk about the gun that killed the person he has
in mind, namely Jones, whom he believes to be
Smith’s murderer. In fact if we were to point
out to him that Jones may not in fact be Smith’s
murderer, he could then withdraw his description,
and plausibly claim that what he intended to talk
about was the gun that killed Jones. He may even
add that he would not be interested in the gun
that may have killed Smith’s murderer, if it turns
out that Jones did not kill Smith.
Similarly, in Donnellan’s original example, when
the detective uses the description “Smith’s mur-
could perhaps be said that the speaker uses the description
“the tenth planet” neither referentially nor attributively.
Alternatively, following Frege, it may also be argued that
the speaker uses the description intending to refer not to
its customary referent but its indirect referent, namely its
sense. Whether that would allow us to extend Donnellan’s
distinction so that it applies to such contexts of use is an
issue to be explored.
derer” attributively, it would seem to be wrong to
claim that his primary intention is to talk about
whoever murdered Smith. Rather he wishes to
talk about whoever murdered the person he has
in mind, whose dead body he sees, whom he takes
to be Smith. Again if were to point out to him
that it may not be Smith’s dead body that he has
observed, he might well say that his primary in-
tention is to talk about the murderer of the man
whose body he sees, even if that man turns out
not to be Smith. So the detective does not sim-
ply “wish to assert something about whatever or
whoever fits that description”, nor is it the case
that “his specific intention is simply to refer to
the semantic referent”, nor would it be true to
say that “the speaker has a primary, identifying,
purely semantic intention” that he could express
by saying “By my use of this term, I intend to
refer to Smith’s murderer”.
A moral to be drawn from all this is that a def-
inite description is rarely used with the primary
intention to refer to “whatever or whoever fits
that description”, for most definite descriptions
are complex and have embedded singular terms
in them that are used referentially. There are, of
course, incomplete definite descriptions that ap-
pear to be simple. However we may be using
them as directly referential terms—in which case
they are not definite descriptions—, or the con-
text may complete them turning them into com-
plex descriptions. The only genuinely simple def-
inite descriptions (i.e. ones which have no em-
bedded singular terms within them) seem to be
singular superlatives such as “the shortest spy”,
or descriptions that uniquely pick out an object
by its general properties, such as “the planet with
rings around it”. Even for such terms, it may well
be argued that they are incomplete; at least for
most such terms we have hidden singular terms
that make reference to a location (the world, the
solar system etc.), and to an instance in time
(now). A complete simple definite description,
such as “the shortest spy, anywhere, any time”,
“the even prime number” etc., is, no doubt, an
extreme rarity of the species. Once we admit that
the complete definite descriptions we use are al-
most always complex, it would seem that they
must have at least one embedded singular term
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that is itself neither a description, nor an abbre-
viation for one. Or else the completion of a defi-
nite description would lead to an infinite regress,
or would end up containing a simple definite de-
scription. Given the rarity of the latter, it would
follow that in almost all complete definite descrip-
tions we use, there must be at least one directly
referential term, such as a demonstrative, a pro-
noun, or a proper name. If such non-descriptive
terms can be used attributively, in the generalized
Kripkean sense, namely with the intention to refer
to their semantic referent, then we may perhaps
have uses of complex definite descriptions that are
used attributively in accordance with Donnellan’s
characterization. For instance, in Donnellan’s ex-
ample, we could suppose that the detective, rather
than using the name “Smith”, more cautiously ut-
ters “his murderer is insane”, by pointing to the
dead body before him. In such a case, it may
be argued that his primary intention is to refer
to whoever his murderer is, this time not allowing
for speaker’s referent to diverge form the semantic
referent of the term.
But even then, the speaker may be mistaken
about the gender of the dead person. And if he
even more cautiously uses “the murderer of that
person”, it may turn out that the dead body be-
longs to an android. Only if he uses, “its mur-
derer” could we perhaps conclude that his primary
intention is to refer to the semantic referent. That
would, of course, require us to take ordinary uses
of certain pronouns and demonstratives, that have
no descriptive content, as being attributive.9 In
the case of proper names, things are even more
difficult. To modify Donnellan’s example slightly,
imagine that the detective has been told by his
assistant that a certain Smith has been brutally
murdered. Before arriving at the murder site, he
exclaims: “Smith’s murderer is insane!” It may
perhaps now be said that the detective’s use of
the name “Smith” is attributive, and in effect we
may wish to hold that his primary intention is to
9One would expect that, on Donnellan’s account, ordi-
nary uses of demonstratives would be paradigm cases of ref-
erential uses. It was David Kaplan, in one of his workshops,
who suggested that they could be classified as attributive,
though to my knowledge this has not appeared in print.
Interestingly, Donnellan, who was in the audience, did not
object, though he did not approve of the position either.
refer to whoever satisfies the description “Smith’s
murderer”. But even then, we could imagine the
assistant being wrong about the identity of the
murdered person. Ordinary uses of proper names
seem to be paradigm cases of referential uses, as
Donnellan suggests when he likens a referential use
of a definite description to the use of a proper
name [2, p. 282].10
Even if we suppose that simple demonstratives,
pronouns, and proper names could have attribu-
tive uses in ordinary contexts, it seems clear to me
that most of the complex definite descriptions we
use are ones in which there are embedded singular
terms used referentially; so if the use of such com-
plex descriptions can not be classified as attribu-
tive, we would end up holding that an attributive
use of a definite description is a much less frequent
linguistic phenomenon then has been presupposed
by Donnellan and others; so much so that Donnel-
lan’s standard examples of the attributive use will
cease to qualify as attributive. Most descriptions
we thought were being used attributively would
fall into a strange no-man’s-land, neither referen-
tial nor attributive. Perhaps Donnellan would be
happy with this result, given that his main pur-
pose in making his distinction was to show that
Russell’s semantic theory gives an account only
of attributive uses of definite descriptions. So if
definite descriptions are used attributively much
less frequently than has commonly been assumed,
then this is, Donnellan may claim, so much the
worse for Russell’s theory. Russell, on the other
hand, might react by pointing out that the con-
clusion we have reached is simply another way of
stating his basic thesis that we construct descrip-
tions by making use of objects of acquaintance,
and then adding that the words we use may not
always capture the description we have in mind.
10Whether ordinary uses of proper names should be clas-
sified as referential or attributive is a matter of controversy.
Some hold that an attributive use of a proper name is a rare
linguistic phenomenon. (See [8], [1], and interestingly [5, p.
85, f.n.36]). Others disagree. (See [6] and [12]). I initially
held that the only way for a proper name to be used attribu-
tively is when the speaker fixes the referent of the name by
an attributive use of a definite description, in the Kripkean
sense. Salmon was convinced by my position [10, esp. p.
188], though I now think that the issue is more complicated
than I had thought [4].
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Either way, our discussion seems to reveal that a
speaker’s intentions concerning the use of a def-
inite description are, in general, too complicated
for the referential/attributive distinction to cap-
ture.
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